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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE· STATE O·F UTAH

BURTON 0. COMPTON, BURTON
STANLEY COMPTON, and LESTER 0. 001\tiPTON,
App·ellamts,
-vs.-

Case No.
7541

OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND
DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,
Respondent.

Appellants' Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants, surviving husband, sons and heirs at
law of Emma Compton, deceased, commenced this action
on October 12, 1949, for general and special damages
alleged to have- been suffered by them following the
wrongful death of Emma Compton by reason of the
negligence of the defendant. The gravamen of the complaint was that while the deceased, with the permission
and license of the defendant, was crossing the railroad
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1

yards operated by the defendant, and at a place where
the public was licensed and permitted to be, was carelessly and negligently killed by the defendant in its
operation of a diesel locomotive.
Respondent, by its answer, admitted all of the foregoing except that it denied the permission and license
by the deceased and public, and further denied each and
all of the alleged acts of negligence by the defendant.
Respondent further alleged that any injury suffered by
the plaintiffs as a result of the death of Emma Compton
was contributed to by the careless and negligent conduct
of Emma Compton herself. -·
The cause came on for trial before the court sitting
with a jury on the 18th day of April, 1950, and upon conclusion of plaintiffs' case the respondent moved for a
judgment of non-suit against the plaintiffs, based upon
the contributory negligence as a matter of law of Emma
Compton, and the court orally granted defendant's motion for dismissal of the action upon the ground of
contributory negligence.
On April 29, 1950, findings of fa.ct, conclusions of
law and judgment were filed.
From the judgment by the court appellants appeal.
In our statement of facts of the case we shall abstract as briefly as possible the testimony of the witnesses and evidence called and produced by the appellants.
2
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Wallace F. Feller, a police officer of the Ogden City
Police Department, testified that early on the morning
of September 8, 1949, he received a call to investigate
an accident on West 24th Street, Ogden, Utah, and
accompanied by one officer, Butcher, another police officer of Ogden, they responded to said call and drove west
on 24th Street to the place where a viaduct crosses the
railroad yards and down underneath the viaduct of the
railroad to the scene of an accident that had occurred.
Upon arriving the officers found that a person, later
identified as Emma Compton, had been killed. The body
was located about "75 feet south on the railroad track
under the viaduct" (R. 7) and about 50 feet further
southeast the diesel locomotive was standing on the
track. This officer then set the point of impact ap-proximately
25. feet south from the westernmost stair,
way by reason of gouge marks along the outside of
the north rail (R. 8). These marks continued parallel
with the railroad for about 50 feet. The witness further
testified to these distances in reference to Exhibit A (R.
15, 16).
I

In a conversation with the train crew the officer
stated, ''All three of them admitted that they never saw
the body or the person until they had passed over her,
and that they were all three riding at the back of the
engine in the· cab". Also, that the locomotive was
coasting down a slight grade and no warning was
sounded (R. 10). The witness testified that he has had
substantial experience in J:>Olice work in Ogden and was
well acquainted with the area where the accident occurSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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red. He testified that he has seen many persons using
the stairway and walking below the stairway, and further that there is a beaten path running along the north
side of the track ''right at the edge of the ties for about
three feet wide" (R. 11, 12).
Plaintiffs introduced as Exhibit A a photograph of
the scene taken the morning of the accident wherein the
well-trodden path is clearly visible (R. 13).
Witness testified that there are various business
activities other than the railroad south of the viaduct
within the yards, such as a creamery and ice plant, and
that to his own knowledge employees of these businesses
use this stairway and path in going to and returning
from their employment (R. 17, 18).
Witness further stated th~t a person walking from
the base of the stairway toward the track along the
path would reach the point of impact before he could
see down the track (R. 25).
Vernon R. Butcher, a member of the police department of Ogden, testified that he was present at the scene
of the accident on the morning of September 8, 1949,
and was present during the conversations with the three
members of the crew of the locomotive involved. Witness testified that all three of the crew members at that
time stated that the engine had passed over deceased's
body before any of them had seen her (R. 28). The
engineer stated that due to a curve in the track he cannot see anything from his side of the cab and that the
4
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other t"\YO rre"\Y members "\Yho "'"ere both in the cab stated
that they were not looking out of the cab windew on
the other side ( R. 29).
Witness further testified that there is a. ''well
beaten" path along the track (R. 29) and to his own
knowledge many employees of various business activities
in the vicinity use the stairway and path in going to and
from their employment (R. 29, 30).
Witness finally testified that the engmeer stated
that the locomotive was coasting down a grade at the
time of the accident (R. 30).
William Klinke, a former employee of the defendant
who had worked in the vicinity of the accident for six
years, testified that it is his own knowledge a great many
people habitually use the stairway in question and in
fact "that it is practically the only way they have to get
down there unless they come down around the road and
that is the way of heavy traffic" (R. 32).
Witness testified that the hazard on all other s~de;;,
of the industries located in this area are so great that
the stairway and path in question are the ''only way
that is half way safe'' for these people to go to work (R.
33).
Witness then stated that during the years when he
was employed by the defendant and was riding locomotives in the area in question he saw people travelling
along the side of the track and ''always had to be on

5
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the lookout for them - you never knew when they were
going to get in front" (R. 34).
This witness further testified that "if anyone comes
down this stairway where a locomotive comes down this
hill, it is hard for the engine crew to see anybody stepping out· here, and it is hard for this person to see the
engine coming, so it is a hazard there" (R. 35).
Witness finally stated that people, as an established
custom, come down the stairway and follow along the
edge of the track (R. 35).
Emily Christensen, a yard clerk employed by the
defendant, testified that she has worked in a building in
the immediate vicinity of the accident for seven years
and has seen people regularly use the stairway in question and walk along the edge of the track at all times
and all seasons.
Mirtle Brady, an employee of the Armour Creamery
and a co-worker and friend of the deceased, testified that
she and the deceased had been employed seasonally by
Armour Company for three years. She had observed
many people using the stairway and path in question in
going to and from work, and used that route herself (R.
41).
Mrs. Earl E. Laws, an employee of Brown Poultry
Company, one of the businesses located in the area in
question, testified that on the morning of the accident
on her way to work she met the deceased at the top of
6
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the stair,Yay, 'valked down the stairs with her and over
to the path. Witness clearly s~ated that as she reached
the lower part of the stairs she looked to see whether
there '"'as any movement on the track and saw nothing.
She later repeated that she saw no train (R. 46).
Witness then stated and later repeated that they
had in fact ,,~alked ~4 FEW STEPS when the accident
occurred (R. 46 and 50), contrary to the third finding of
fact, that she and deceased had walked two or three
steps along the track. She had not heard any sound of
the approaching train, nor had she seen the train whic]l
came from behind them (R. 46 and 50) .. Witness stated
that she had previously used the same route to go to
work and had seen many others doing so (R. 47).
Both this witness and witness Christensen stated
that the morning of the accident was clear (R. 38, 40).
Throughout the transcript of testimony the fact
repeatedly appears that the locomotive approached from
behind deceased and witness Laws (R. 7, 9). It further
appears that anyone proceeding from the bottom of the
stairway along the well defined and heavily traveled path
traversed by the deceased in the direction taken by the
deceased, would have his back toward a train coming
along the track, as did the locomotive in the instance in
question. This is true from the moment he left the stairway, due to the fact that the path runs at an angle from
the base of the stairway to a point where it parallels
the track (R. 9, 11, 12, 15, 21).

7
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Witness Laws emphatically and repeatedly stated
that the train came from behind deceased and herself
and that the :first time she saw the train was when it
struck Mrs. Compton (R. 46, 49).
Mr. Earl Compton testified that he had taken photographs comprising plaintiffs' Exhibits E through N,
showing various views of the area involved herein as it
appeared only six days after the accident (R. 56, 61).
From an examination of these photographs it clearly
appears that a large concrete abutment near the bottom
of the stairway interferes with the view of the track by
anyone standing on the stairs or at the bottom thereof.
The rest ·of the material evidence concerned the
subject of damages.
STATElVIENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
BY APPEI_JLANTS
Appellants rely upon the following points:
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A DISMISSAL OF
THE ACTION AND RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT AND FILING ITS WRITTEN
JUDGMENT PURSUANT THERETO ON THE
GROUND OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF
THE DECEASED, EMMA COMPTON, AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
POINT II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE EVIDENCE DO NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW NUMBERS I AND II THAT THE DE8
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CEASED EMl\iA COMPTON WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, AND THAT SAID
CONTRIBUTOR1T NEGLIGENCE WAS A COMP:CETE BAR TO THE ACTION AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
RESPONDENT'S l\10TION FOR DISMISSAL OF
THE . ~CTION
.
AND A DIRECTED VERDICT AND
IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE APPELLANTS'
CASE TO THE JURY ON THE 'THEORY OF LAST
CLEAR CH . L\_NCE.
.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A DISMISSAL OF
THE ACTION AND RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT AND FILING ITS WRITTEN
JUDGI\IENT PURSUANT THERETO ON THE
GROUND OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGEN.CE OF
THE DECEASED, EMMA COMPTON, AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
POINT II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE EVIDENCE DO NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW NUMBERS I ...L\ND II THAT THE DECEASED EMMA COMPTON WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, AND THAT SAID
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS A COMPLETE BAR TO THE ACTION AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
These points are directed to the trial court's ruling
granting respondent's motion for a dismissal of the
action and directed verdict, and will be argued together.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In considering the action of the trial court in its
determinatjon of contributory negligence of the deceased
as a matter of law, appellants are entitled, at the outset,
to the presumption that the deceased was in the exercise
of due care. Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 40
Utah 483, 123 Pac. 97 ; Tremelling v. Southern Pacific
Co., 51 Utah 189, 170 Pac. 80; Barker v. Savas, et al,
52 Utah 262, 172 Pac. 672; Perrin v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
59 Utah 1, 201 Pac. 405. Even though a lady companion,
Mrs. Laws, was walking along with the deceased on her
right, there is no direct evidence as to just how the
accident happened.
Unless this case IS one of those exceptional cases
mentioned in Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co.,
supra, where but one conclusion can be drawn from the
undisputed evidence, this presumption alone would entitle appellants to have the issue of contributory negligence submitted to the jury and in that same case, this
court, speaking through Justice McCarty, stated:

'' * * * Moreover, in cases of this kind, where
the accident results in instant death, the rule
seems to be that 'the law, out of regard to the
instinct of self-preservation, presumes that the
deceased at the time was in the exercise of due
care, ''and this presumption is not ove-rthrown
by the mere fact of injury.'' The burden rests
upon the defendant to rebut this presumption.'
(Flynn v. K. C., ·St. J. & C. B. R. Co., 78 Mo. 212,
47 Am. Rep. 99.)
''The Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in the case of Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Spike,
121 Fed. 44, 57 C.C.A. 384, which involved this
10
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same prinri ple, after referring to the language of
the :Nfissouri court ""hirh w·e have quoted, said:
'' 'The presumption arising from this natural
instinct of self-preservation stands in the place
of positive evidence, and is sufficient to warrant
a recovery, in the absence of countervailing testimony.'
''Citing with approval the following cases:
Johnson v. Railroad Co., 20 N. Y. 65, 69, 75 Am.
Dec. 375-; Oldfield v. N. Y. & Harland R. Co., 14
N. Y. 310; Adams v. Iron Cliffs Co., 78 Mich. 271,
44 N. W. 270, 18 Am. St. Rep. 441; Railway Co.
v. State, 29 Md. 420, 438, 96 Am. Dec. 545; Railroad Co. v. Nowicki, 46 Ill. App. 566; City of
Naples, 32 U. S. App. 613, 16 C.C.A. 421, 69 Fed.
794; Allen v. Willard, 57 Pa. 374; Schum v. Railroad Co., 107 Pa. 8, 52 Am. Rep. 468; Cox v. Railroad Co., 123 N. C. 604, 31 S.E. 848; Cameron v.
Railway Co., 8 N. D. 124, 77 N. W. 1016.
"In the case of Ready v. Peavey Elevator Co.,
89 Minn. 154, 94 N. W. 442, the court said :
" 'It is well to note that negligence is usually
a question of fact, and that it is only in exceptional cases, where but one conclusion can be
drawn from the undisputed evidence, that it is
one of law; that, where a charge is made against
a dead man that he was guilty of negligence causing his death, the presumption is very strong that,
prompted by the instinct of self-preservation, he
exercised due care, and that the presumption continues until the contrary is clearly made to
appear.'
''Ap-plying the well-settled principles of law
to the facts in this case, we are not warranted in
holding that Lewis was, as a matter of law, guilty
of contributory negligence. Evans v. 0. S. L. R.

11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Co., 37 Utah 431, 108 Pac. 638; 2 Thomp. on Neg.,
section 1699. ''
Also, in Perrin v. Union Pac. R. Co., supra, this
court reaffirmed its position as follows:
''There was no direct evidence as to just how
the accident happened. It was the duty of the
deceased to go between the cars, after coupling
was made and the train became stationary, to
connect the air hose and open the angle cock
between the train and the caboose. Under the
facts disclosed by this record, the respondent was
entitled to the presumption that the deceased
was, at the time of the accident, in the exercise
of ordinary care. Lewis v. Rio Grande Western
Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483, 123 Pac. 97. That presumption alone would entitle the respondent to have
the question of contributory negligence submitted
to the jury if there is evidence in the record tending to prove negligence on the part of the appellant."
Upon an examination of the case under consideration in the light of the presumption of due care, the
foregoing cases, and the facts, it is found:
(a) There is no direct evidence as to just how the
accident happened as concerns the- deceased, Emma
Compton, and particularly the absence of any evidence
as to what precautions were taken by the deceased for
her own safety or protection.
(b) There is evidence in the record proving the
negligence of the defendant, and in this respect the atten-

12
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tion of the court is inYited to Finding of Fact No. II of
the :finding·s of fact in the transcript on appeal herein.
(c) There is no countervailing testimony on behalf
of defendant.
There can be no serious disput~ as to the statements
made in a, b, and c, and the trial court's ruling was based
entirely upon the idea that the conclusion of contributory
negligence on the part of the deceased was the only one
that could be drawn. This the appellants deny.
The evidence showed that a person approaching the
lower part of the stairway upon which deceased was
descending could not, because of the concrete abutment
immediately to the west, see the entire track to the northwest, as a considerable portion of the track was blocked
out by this abutment, and this situation is clearly shown
by defendant's Exhibit No. 1. As a matter of fact, the
witness Mrs. Laws looked to the westward while at that
place and failed to see any movement or traffic upon
the track to the westward (R. 45, 46). The only reasonable inferences applicable at that time and place were
that the engine had not yet put in an appearance coming
from that direction, or that the engine, standing or moving, was blocked out by the concrete abutment. This abutment was only five feet north of the track (R. 19). When
the deceased and Mrs. Laws left the bottom of the stairway the well-trodden and rough dirt pathway took a
direction to the southeast, so that when the deceased and
her companion came into a position where a full view

13
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of the tracks could be had they were walking with their
backs to the direction from which the engine approached.
The court will notice from plaintiffs' Exhibit C that this
pathway, upon immediately leaving the bottom of the
stairway, approaches the track upon an acute angle to
the southeast, and the court will further notice that upon
passing the two posts shown in that exhibit that the
pathway then takes a direction which almost immediately
parallels the tracks. If the deceased, up to the point of
reaching those posts, had carefully looked for any train
or cars approaching from the westward, and having seen
nothing, as did the witness Mrs. Laws, she was not then
required to maintain a constant lookout to the northwest while she was walking southeast. The court knows
that reasonable persons, exercising due caution for their
own safety, and especially while going along a rough
pathway in railroad yards, look where they are goingnot where they ha.ve been-and the deceased had every
right, in the exercise of due care for her own safty, to
rely upon her other senses, and particularly in this case,
her sense of hearing. Noises and loud sounds are expected by people of normal experience from locomotive
engines, and the important fact that cannot be overloooked in this case was that this diesel engine was
QUIETLY coasting down grade, not under power, and
gave no warning of any kind of its approach. It literally
''sneaked'' up behind the two women who were walking
upon the pathway paralleling the track and this fact,
if nothing else, had a tendency to mislead the two pedestrians than would have been the case if the diesel engine
had been run in a natural way.

14
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In the case of Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. R.
Co., 43 Utah 219, 134 Par. 567, this court reversed a
judgment for the defendant, and, in doing so, on page
571 of that decision stated:
"The fact that in this case the engine and
tender were running backwards might have had
a tendency to confuse, if not mislead, the deceased
much more than might have been the case if the
engine had been run in a natural way. * * * In
view of all the circumstances, the question with
regard to whether or not the deceased exercised
ordinary care is, to say the least, one of uncertainty and doubt, and hence must be submitted to
the triers of the fact for their determination.''
The misleading and confusing effect that the operation of an engine in this manner can have upon people
is demonstrated by the testimony of Mrs. ·Laws.
'' Q. Now as you reached the lower part of
these stairs, did you look to the westward to see
whether or not there was any movement upon the
track that comes through the viaduct there~-

"A. Yes I did, but I didn't see nothing.

''Q. You didn't see any

train~

''A. I didn't see a train.'' (R. 45, 46)
'' Q. Now did you ever hear any sound of a
train prior to that time, Mrs. Laws~

"A. No.

'"'Q. To this

occurrence~

"A. No.
'' Q. And from which direction had that train
come~ Was it from your back to your front~

15
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''A. From the back. ' ' ( R. 46)
Again upon cross-examination this same witness said:
'' Q. Did you say anything at all to Mrs.
Compton, here comes the Bamberger.~

''A. As Mrs. Compton fell I said, 'Here comes
·the train', but I didn't see the train until I looked
up and seen the wheels go over her, but I just
thought that is what happ~ned, that it had hit
her."
All of the foregoing facts, assumptions, and reasonable inferences were ignored by the trial court.
Further, there is no positive evidence in the record
that,. had the deceased looked to the westward at the
time she was closely approaching the track and at a
time when her back was turned, and at a time when her
view was not obscured by the abutment or otherwise,
that the engine would have been seen. It lies only within
the knowledge of the train crew ho'v fast this equipment
rounded the eurve and came into view, and then down
the grade, and it is perfectly possible that the engine had
been coming at quite a speed and then braked down
shortly before running over and killing Mrs. Compton.
Thus, the evidence is not clear and free from doubt that,
had the deceased looked, she would have seen its approach. The only possible evidence on this subject was
the admission of the engineer, Mr. Smith, that he was
"coasting about ten miles per hour" (R. 10). Viewing
that stataeament in the light most favorable to appellants is that the train was coasting at a speed of ten
miles per hour at the place where Mrs. Compton was
killed.
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Again the trial court ignored the foregoing reasonable inferences and substituted its own fact not in evidence, and throughout the entire matter the court
assumed that the deceased, regardless of the peculiar
facts and circumstances surrounding this case, was required to maintain a constant watch to her rear, contrary
to the right of the jury to make that d~termination, and
as declared by this eourt in the case ·of Malizia v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 53 Utah 122, 178 Pac. 756:
''Again, whether, under a particular state of
facts and circumstances, a traveler may be excused from maintaining a constant lookout in a
particular direction is also, except in clear cases,
a question of fact.''
Appellants urge that the facts and circumstances
surrounding the death of Emma Compton were squarely
within the following language of the 1\Ializia case, supra :
''Now, whether the deceased should have acted
differently, in view of all the circumstances, and
whether what occurred at the time was sufficient
to. excuse his conduct in attempting to cross the
tracks, were all questions for the jury to solve,
and cannot be determined either for or against
him as questions of law. To say that but one conclusion, namely, that the deceased was guilty of
negligence barring a recovery, is permissible, is,
to our minds, ignoring many things which may
affect human conduct under particular circumstances.
"While as triers of fact we might entertain
doubts whether the conduct of the deceased in
passing in front of the front engine under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, was excus-
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able or not, yet it is that very doubt, as was said
in Newton v. Railroad Co., 43 Utah 219, 134 Pac.
567, which makes it a question for the jury, and
which requires us to yield to their judgment. This
case does not fall within the principle which controlled the cases of Tremelling v. Southern Pac1
R. Co., 170 Pac. 80; Teakle v. Railroad, 32 Utah,
276, 90 Pac. 402, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 486; Wilkinson
v. Railroad, 35 U tab 110, 99 Pac. 446; Bates v.
Railroad, 38 Utah, 568, 114 Pac. 527; and Kent v.
Railroad, 167 Pac. 666; but it falls within the
doctrine laid down in Newton v. Railroad, supra,
namely, that where the facts and circumstances
are such as to justify fair-minded men to arrive
at different conclusions 'vith respect to the question of negligence on the part of the defendant,
or with respect to contributory negligence on the
part of the injured person, or with reference to
whether the negligence of the one or the other
was the proximate cause of the accident, the case
is one for the jury and not for the court. We can
see no escape from the conclusion in this case
that, in view of the facts and circumstances, it
was proper to submit it to the jury.''
Other case of interest decided by this court where
the facts and circumstances involved create no greater
doubt than the facts and circumstances in this case are:
Clark v. Union Pac. R. Co., 70 Utah 29, 257 Pac.
1050.
Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 79 Utah 439,
11 Pac. 2d 305.
Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., supra.
Newton v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 43 Utah 219,
134 Pac. 567.
Perrin v. Union Pac. R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 Pac.
405.
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POINT III.
THE TRI.A.L COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
RESPONDENT'S l\IOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF
THE .A.CTION AND A DIRECTED VERDICT AND
IN REFUSING TO SUBl\IIT THE APPELLANTS'
C.A. SE TO THE JURY ON THE THEORY OF LAST
CLEAR CHANCE.
At the expense and danger of repeating ourselves,
it is found necessary to again discuss certain material
facts in discussing this point. From the moment the deceased Emma Compton left the bottom of the stairway
mentioned in this ease and started on the rough dirt
pathway which approa.cheq the track on an acute angle
to the southeast, she was in a position of peril. At
least until she passed the wooden posts to the north
of the bottom of the stairway her view of the track was
obstructed by the concrete abutment. As she proceeded
from the stairway along this well defined path, approaching at the acute angle and then parallel to the track, she
was at all times facing away from the direction from
which the train came. Again it is necessary to remind
tlie court that the witness Laws, who was walking to the
left of the deeeased, stated that she, the wtiness Laws,
neither saw nor heard any locomotive approach. In other
words, Laws and the deceased, walking with their backs
turned toward the direction from which the train came,
were completely and entirely oblivious of its approach.
The train was necessarily some distance behind these
two women, and even a casual glance by any member of
the crew would have made known to them the inattention
of these two women.
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Under such circumstances, in the case of State v.
Shain, 349 Mo. 27, 159 S. E. 2d 586, the court said:
"This fact of obliviousness in and of itself
can place a plaintiff in a position of peril. In other
words, under the cited decisions, if a plaintiff is
approaching the pathway of the defendant on a
course which, unless he stops, will produce a collision and if he is at the time oblivious to the
presence and approach of the defendant, this in
itself will cause him to be in a position of peril
and not merely approaching a position of peril."
The Restatement of Torts, Section 480, comment b,
states:
' 'Even such a chance that the plain tiff will not
discover his peril is enough to require the defendant to make a reasonable effort to avoid injuring him. Therefore, if there is anything in the
demeanor or conduct of the plaintiff which to a
reasonable man in the defendant's position would
indicate that the plaintiff is inattentive and, therefore, will or may not discover the approach of the
train, the engineer must take such steps as a
reasonable man would think necessary under the
circumstances. If a train is at some little distance,
the blowing of a whistle would ordinarily be
enough, until it is apparent that the whistle is
either unheard or disregarded. The situation in
which the plaintiff is observed may clearly indicate that his inattention is likely to persist and
that the blowing of the whistle will not be effective. If so, the engineer is not entitled to act upon
the assumption that the plaintiff will awaken to
his danger but may be liable if he does not so
reduce the speed of his train as to. enable him to
stop if necessary. Thus, if the engineer sees a
Yehicle with the side curtains so drawn a.s to
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obstruct the driYer's view approaching on a day
so 'vindy as to make it doubtful 'vhether the
" ..histle will be heard, he may not be entitled to
assume that the driver 'viii discover the approach
of the train and may be liable if he fails to exercise reasonable care to bring his train under the
necessary control.''
In this ease it affirmatively and conclusively appears that the deceased " . as oblivious to her danger and,
being una". are of it, obviously could not discover her
peril in time to remove herself and avoid the injury. Her
back being to,vard the train at all times she could not see
its approach, and not being able to see the danger she
"\Yould, as a reasonable and normal person, be expected
to use her other senses, including her sense of hearing,
to detect the danger. The train was quietly coasting
down grade during its approach to the time of impact,
eliminating the possibility of a warning from this source_.
There '""as no sounding of a bell, horn, whistle or other
warning device.
In the case of Huggans v. Southern Pac. Co., -----·
Calif. ______ , 207 Pac. 2d 864, it is unequivocally stated that
the doctrine of last clear chance applies to a person a pproaching a -Place of peril unaware of his danger, in such
a manner that, if he remains oblivious, he will put himself in a position in which an injury to himself will result.
Following the rule laid down in the Huggins case, supra,
the last clear chance doctrine applies here, since deceased was approachng a position of peril from the moment she left the stairway, and she was completely unaware of the approaching danger, and such inattentive-
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ness and obliviousness was known or should have been
known to the operators of the locomootive. Under these
circumstances, and following the restatement rule, the
defendant clearly had a duty to make a reasonable effort
to avoid the injury. No effort whatsoever was made.
The evidence clearly shows that it was a long established and well known use and custom for many people
to use the stairway and path here involved. The defendant obviously knew of and acquiesced, if not invited, in
this use and custom. In such a situation the defendant's
train operators were bound and obligated to keep a
reasonable lookout for and anticipate the presence of
people in the position of the deceased in order to prevent
injury to them.
Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 32 Utah
275, 90 Pac. 402.
The fact that the train crew in this case were so
grossly inattentive that no member of .the crew was
keeping a. lookout and thus failed to see the deceased in
a position of peril does not excuse the defendant nor
deny the application of the doctrine.
In the Teakle case, supra, the court stated:
"The more frequent declaration that the defendant is not liable, unless he actually sees or
knows the plaintiff's peril, are, however, equally
erroneous, as too broad statements of abstract
law, however proper they may have been with
reference to the particular case under consideration. The rule that a plaintiff is as matter of law
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negligent if he fails to see what he was bound to
look for and ought to have seen is rigidly enforced ; and the same rule must, in common justice, be applied to the defendant."
In discussing Point III appellants are not unmindful
of the recent cases of Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346,
166 Pac. 2d 230; Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R. Co., 112
Utah 189, 186 Pa.c. 2d 293; and Holmgren v. Union Pa.c.
R·. Co., ______ Utah ______ , 198 ?ac. 459, wherein this court
has discussed the rule of last clear chance.
In the Graham ease, supra, this court, in discussing
the rule of last clear chance, recognized Section 480, Vol.
2, of Restatement of Torts. In that case this court,
speaking through Justice Wolfe, stated:
"Sec. 480 deals with the situation where the
plaintiff was inattentive but had the abiltiy, h~d
he been alert, to avoid the oncoming danger to
which the aefendant was subjecting him. But in
both cases the liability of the defendant arose
because he failed to take the opportunity which
he alone had time to avoid doing . the plaintiff
harm even though the plaintiff was negligent in
getting himself in a position where he was help.;.
less or because he was so inattentive that he was
not alert to the approaching danger over which
defendavnt had control. And in both cases to hold
the defendant liable it must plainly appear to the
jury that defendant knew or reasonably should
have known of plaintiff's helpless pBril or of his
inattention and alter such realization or after he
reasonably, had he been conductiJn,g himself with
the vigilwnce required of ~~im, should have known
it, 'is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable
care and competence his then existing ability to
23
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avoid harming the plaintiff.' In the clear chance
doctrine the plaintiff's negligence has become in
a sense :fixed and realizable and on to this state
of things defendant approaches on to the negligent plaintiff with and in control of the danger.

* * * * *
''The jury could find that Darlene, if she was
approaching in line with the inattentive Gary or
so approximately in line with him as to seemingly
be an approaching danger to him, should have
realized that he was unaware of her approach and
timely warned him.''
The Van Wagoner case, supra, wherein this court
denied the plaintiff the application of the rule, is distinguishable from the instant case. The court concluded
that the train operatives were able to assume that the
driver of the approaching vehicle would stop until he
was so close to the railroad track that a reasonable person would have known otherwise, but when that distance
of knowing otherwise was made apparent there was ~o
reasonable opportunity to stop the train in time to avoid
the collision. In the instant case no one will seriously
argue that it would have taken nothing more than the
sounding of a horn or the ringing of a bell to have warned
deceased and a voided this tragic death. Also, this locomotive had the ability to stop within approximately fifty
feet of the body of the deceased when nothing of the
accident was known to them until they had passed over
the body before any member of the crew had seen her.
This is shown clearly by plaintiffs' Exhibit A, and is
shown in that exhibit at the place where Officer Feller
found it and the body (R. 12).
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In the Van-Wagoner case Justice Latimer recognized
the theory under Section 480 of the Restatement of Torts
as did Justice Wolfe in the Graham ease.
The Holmgren case, supra, denied the plaintiff the
right to apply the rule, but again in that case the court
recogni_zed the situation of reasonable apparent inattention and obliviousness to approaching danger. The court
stated that train operatives have a right to assume that
the car would stop in a place of safety, ''provided there
was no appearance in the acts of conduct of the driver
or the movements of the car, or other circumstances, to
indicate that the driver was oblivious and did not intend
to stop.'' And in quoting Thomasson v. Henwood, 235
Mo. App. 211, 146 S.W. 2d 88, 93, '' * * * and there is
nothing in the conduct of the driver to indicate that he
is unaware of the approaching train, no duty rests upon
the engineer to act, either in the duty of reducing the
speed of his train or sounding a warning' whistle.'' Immediately following the quotation of the Thomasson case
the court states : '' The rules stated in the a hove q noted
authorities are followed in this jurisdiction.''
In conclusion it appears desirable to point out that
the status of the deceased, while upon the respondent's
yards as a business invitee and has a duty owing to her
as such, is not directly presented or argued for the
reason that the negligence of respondent was made a
jury issue, and even though this same negligence bordered upon a wanton, reckless and criminal act upon the
part of the train crew and respondent when they deliber25
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ately shut their eyes to a dangerous use that had existed
at that time and place for many years. The basic idea
behind the presumption of due care and the rule of last
clear chance, based, as they are, upon human experience
and a humanitarian policy, are designed to protect
against this very same set of circumstances and careless
action, and to insure to the injured parties their fundamental right to a jury determination of the rights and
duties involved.
Appellants sincerely submit that the trial court erred
in each of the rulings specified under the points herein
presented and argued.
Respectfully submitted,

HANSON, KESLER & HANSON,
EDWARD G. LINSLEY, and
I..~EON.A.RD W. ELTON,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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